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A recently completed survey of British manufacturing investment in 
fourteen anglophone African countries indicates that there has been 
major disinvestment during the last five years. This process of 
corporate disengagement is occuring despite concerted attempts by 
African governments to improve the overall investment climate for 
both national and foreign investors.   The article analyses the pattern 
of disinvestment by country and industrial sector and considers some 
of the key causal factors. 
 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This article presents and analyses the results of a recently completed survey that shows 
widespread disinvestment among UK manufacturing companies with subsidiaries and 
asscociate companies in anglophone Africa during the period 1989-1994. For the proponents 
of structural adjustment, such a process of disinvestment is potentially very serious.  Rapid 
sustainable development of an efficient, internationally competitive  private sector is the 
single most important medium-long term objective of structural adjustment programmes in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In order to achieve this objective, SSA governments, the World 
Bank and other multilateral and bilateral aid donors are placing increased emphasis on the 
need to attract substantial inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), not only in order to 
increase historically very low rates of private investment but also to ensure access to modern 
technologies and world markets. Failure to do so, it is argued, will seriously affect the  
development of the private sector as a whole (and particularly its capacity to absorb new 
labour market entrants and retrenched public sector employees) and the gap in technological  
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capabilities between SSA and the rest of the world will widen still further with the 
concomitant danger that the continent as a whole will remain marginal to the on-going 
process of global economic integration. 
 
Since the late 1980s, governments in SSA have started to make concerted attempts to 
improve the investment climate for transnational corporations and other foreign investors. 
Most have promulgated new investment codes that have swept to one side many of the 
restrictions and impediments that had so seriously limited FDI in the past and replaced them 
with a variety of investment incentives and guarantees. In addition, one stop investment 
centres have been established in order to respond to investment enquiries and to facilitate 
rapid approval of investment projects. While numerous impediments to increased FDI 
remain, for the first time the majority of SSA governments are actively wooing foreign 
investors. And, in contrast to pre-adjustment policy regimes, FDI is being targeted on 
manufacturing and other productive activities that are internationally competitive, preferably 
labour intensive and do not rely on excessive levels of protection, monopoly and clientelism.  
 
In view of the importance that is attached to increasing FDI in SSA, the response of foreign 
investors to the new macroeconomic and investment policy regimes is of central importance 
in any assessment of the overall process of structural adjustment. Since most  adjustment 
programmes in SSA were first introduced before 1987, it is possible to analyse what has 
happened to FDI over at least a 6-7 year period.1 With regard to investment promotion 
policies, significant reforms have only been enacted during the last 2-3 years. Thus, it is too 
early  to make any meaningful assessment of their impact. 
 
The available data on stocks and flows of FDI (most notably from the IMF and OECD) are 
notoriously unreliable and inconsistent and are too aggregated for detailed country and 
sectoral level analysis. Nonetheless, in its 1994 report 'Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, 
Results and the Road Ahead', the World Bank confidently states that "FDI increased slightly 
during adjustment, especially in the countries that improved economic policies. It rose in 
nine of the thirteen countries where policies improved and data were available2 - and 
declined in six of the eleven countries where policies deteriorated" [World Bank, 1994:155]. 
 
The main objective of the above-mentioned survey is to analyse in detail a key segment of 
FDI during adjustment, namely British manufacturing investment in anglophone Africa. The 
fourteen countries that make up anglophone Africa have been categorised as follows:(i) 
Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe that have, according to the Adjustment in 
Africa Report made "large improvements in macroeconomic policies" during adjustment; (ii) 
Malawi, Kenya and Uganda that have made "slight improvements"; (iii) Sierra Leone and 
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Zambia where macroeconomic policies "deteriorated"; and (iv) Botswana, Lesotho, and 
Swaziland who did not embark on Bank designed adjustment programmes and war torn 
Liberia.3 Collectively, these fourteen countries accounted for 54.6% of the total population 
and 58.3% of total manufacturing value added in sub-Saharan Africa in 1990. 
 
Over 90% of UK manufacturing investment in SSA as a whole (excluding South Africa and 
Namibia) was located in anglophone countries in the early 1990s.  Furthermore, British 
corporate investment typically comprises between 50-80% of all manufacturing FDI in each  
country.4 Consequently, recent trends in the level of British corporate involvement in SSA 
are not only important in their own right but may also be indicative of similar trends among 
manufacturing companies from other countries. For example, the number of German 
companies with Nigerian investments dropped from 66 to 44 between 1991 and 1993 [See 
Thompson, 1992]. 
 
The following assessment of British manufacturing FDI in anglophone SSA is based on two 
soures of data. The first is published and unpublished data from the annual Business Monitor 
surveys of Overseas Transactions and triennial Censuses of British Overseas Assets 
conducted by the  UK Central Statistical Office (CSO). These data can be used to analyse 
overall trends in British manufacturing FDI in SSA during the period prior to the 
introduction of adjustment programmes in the early-mid 1980s and the five-ten years since 
the onset of these policy regimes.  
 
The second set of data is two comprehensive surveys of all equity involvements by 
registered British companies in manufacturing activities in the 14 anglophone SSA countries 
undertaken by the author in 1989 and 1994 [see Bennell, 1990]. Both surveys sought to 
answer the following basic questions: 
 
How many UK parent companies had on-going equity involvements in each country? What 
was the distribution of these involvements among parent companies? 
 
What were the characteristics of these parent companies in terms of key size indicators 
(global turnover, employment, net assets and total number of countries in which they had 
subsidiaries and associates)? 
 
What were the total number of equity involvements in each country and for each type of 
manufacturing  activity? 
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What was the overall pattern of equity involvements? In particular, what was the extent of 
minority shareholdings? 
 
What have been the principal factors influencing the levels of equity involvements and what 
are the main constraints likely to impede higher levels of manufacturing  investment in the 
future? 
 
By comparing the number and patterns of equity involvements in the benchmark survey of 
1989 with those in the five year follow-up survey in 1994, it is possible to obtain a detailed 
and accurate assessment of trends in British manufacturing FDI during a key phase of the 
adjustment process in Africa.  
 
The full results of the survey have been presented elsewhere [See Bennell, 1994]. The 
purpose of this article is to analyse major trends in British manufacturing investment in SSA 
since the late 1980s and consider a number of possible factors and explanations. The 
discussion is organised as follows. First, the data used for the research are described in some 
detail. The second section examines the CSO data on the book value and net investments of 
British industrial investment before and during adjustment in SSA countries. The third 
section summarises the main findings of the 1989 and 1994 equity involvement surveys. A 
number of explanatory factors for the observed trends in British manufacturing in SSA, in 
particular during the period 1989-1994, are then analysed. The discussion concludes with an 
overall assessment of the response of British manufacturing FDI in SSA during adjustment 
and likely prospects in the medium-long term. 
 
 
II. DATA SOURCES 
 
The CSO's annual Business Monitor MA4 of Overseas Transactions gives detailed 
information on the net earnings, net investment and book values of  British investments by 
geographical region and main recipient country disaggregated by sector. This is a very 
valuable source of up to date, good quality data that can be readily used for time series 
analysis. In addition, the CSO also made available unpublished data on net investment, net 
earnings, net assets, and  dividends and profit remittances for the individual African 
countries included in the survey. 
 
The main objective of the 1989 and 1994 surveys was to obtain detailed and accurate 
information on all equity involvements of British registered companies in substantive 
manufacturing activities in anglophone SSA countries.5 These companies were initially 
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identified using UK and African national company directories, lists of 'British connected' 
companies distributed by the British High Commission in each country and other relevant 
publications. For the initial survey in 1989, all parent companies were then written to and 
asked to confirm whether the company had an ownership stake in one or more 
manufacturing enterprises in any anglophone SSA country and, if so to provide information 
on the percentage of the equity held and the types of products manufactured. Obtaining this 
information was very time consuming but nevertheless essential because of the many errors 
and omissions contained in the company directories coupled with the difficulty of 
ascertaining whether the companies listed were actually engaged in manufacturing rather 
than just trade and/or service activities. In fact, further research undertaken for the 1994 re-
survey  revealed that nearly a quarter of the equity involvements originally enumerated in 
the 1989 survey were engaged in activities with no or very little manufacturing value added 
or were just 'shell' companies and thus dormant. 
 
Only British companies registered under the UK companies Act were  surveyed. British 
based companies with subsidiaries and associates6 owned by foreign parent companies were 
originally excluded in the 1989 survey but were subsequently included in both survey years. 
Individual British nationals also have ownership stakes in manufacturing enterprises 
operating in survey countries. Little is known about these individuals, but from the names 
that are available many of them are of Asian descent. However, since they are not UK 
registered corporate entities, they have been excluded from both surveys. 
 
UK companies with confirmed manufacturing equity involvements were requested to 
complete a short questionnaire on the activities of their subsidiaries and associates. A two 
page questionnaire was used in 1989 that asked companies to provide precise information on 
capital employed, turnover, net investment and profits for each activity. Twenty parent 
companies (out of a total of 90) with 39 equity involvements  satisfactorily completed the 
questionnaire. In an attempt to improve the response rate, the 1994 questionnaire was just 
one page long and, for each involvement, parent companies were only asked to furnish the 
following information: (i) total employees and expatriates, the percentage change in the 
nominal value of production between 1989 and 1993, and the rate of return on capital 
employed in 1993; (ii) their future intentions (if any); (iii) the four factors in order of 
importance that would most encourage them to make further investments. In the event,  the 
response rate was slightly higher with 19 parent companies (out of 65) with 58 equity 
involvements returning the questionnaire.7  While the perceived commercial sensitivity of  
the data requested was an important factor preventing completion, many companies stated 
that they were deluged with questionnaires of various kinds and senior managers did not 
have time to complete them. 
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III.   BRITISH FDI BEFORE AND DURING ADJUSTMENT:AN OVERVIEW 
 
In global terms, manufacturing investment by British companies in Africa is relatively 
inconsequential. At the height of the economic crisis in Africa during the mid 1980s, net 
manufacturing UK investment IN SSA amounted to barely 0.5% of the world total. There 
has been some nominal increase in the overall level of  UK manufacturing investment in 
Africa since then but, in real terms, average annual net manufacturing investment for all 
Africa (excluding South Africa) during 1988-1992 was only 10-15% higher than during the 
period 1980-1987. 
 
Table 1 shows total and manufacturing UK investment among anglophone SSA countries 
grouped according to the IBRD's three macroeconomic performance categories. For UK 
investment as a whole, a clear positive correlation exists between the percentage change in 
net investment and the degree of improvement in macroeconomic policies as adjudged by the 
World Bank. It should be noted however that changes in investment levels were highly 
uneven among countries in each performance category and the overall figures are dominated 
by one country. This highlights the serious limitations of making inter-group comparisons 
with only small numbers of countries. 
 
Turning to manufacturing investment, an inverse relationship exists between changes in UK 
net investment and country macroeconomic performance, with the largest percentage 
increases in investment levels being recorded among countries with small improvements and 
deterioration in their overall macroeconomic policies and the smallest percentage increases 
in investment among countries with large improvements in their macroeconomic policies. 
While therefore the assertion made in the Adjustment in Africa Report that total FDI has 
improved slightly during adjustment is generally supported by the UK data, with regard to 
the manufacturing sector, the degree of country adjustment has had no systematic positive 
impact on net investment levels by UK companies. One possible explanation for this is that 
the effects of far reaching macroeconomic adjustments (in particular very sizeable 
devaluations) may have substantially dampened any increases in foreign investment, at least 
in the short run, whereas in countries where adjustment has been more limited or where there 
have been policy reversals, acute shortages of foreign exchange may have prevented foreign 
investors from remitting profits thus forcing them to re-invest locally.8 
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IV.  UK EQUITY INVOLVEMENTS  
 
In mid 1989, 90 British companies had a total of 336 equity involvements in manufacturing 
enterprises in anglophone SSA countries. By mid 1994, there were only 65 companies with 
equity stakes in 233 manufacturing enterprises (see Table 2). In total, over half of the 1989 
parent companies had  disinvested -  28  (31.1%) completely and another 20  (22.2%) 
partially.  This dramatic process of corporate disengagement has been concentrated in three 
countries - Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe - where two-thirds of British equity involvements 
were located. At the very least therefore, adjustment in anglophone SSA has been unable to 
prevent widespread disinvestment and may well in fact have hastened the process (see 
below). Equally significant, it also appears that the level of disinvestment (as measured by 
equity involvements) is as high among the IBRD's high improvement countries as it is those 
countries that were categorised as poor performers. 
 
The 1989 survey found that approximately one-third of UK companies with manufacturing 
equity involvements in the 14 survey countries in the late 1970s disinvested during the 
1980s. It is clear, therefore, that the disinvestment that occurred in the period 1989-1994 
represents a continuation, albeit accelerated, of an already well established process of 
corporate withdrawal. Some of the most important disinvesting companies included the 
following: Chloride and Lucas (car batteries), Leyland Trucks (vehicle assembly), 
Courtaulds (paper, packaging, paper), Boots and Wellcome (pharmaceutical), ICI 
(chemicals), Low and Bonar (textiles, plastics, engineering), Pilkington (glass), Raleigh 
(bicycles), Norcros (metal door and window frames), Silentnight (furniture), Whitecroft 
(plastics, office equipment), Bain and RTZ (tools, implements), Lonrho (paper, printing and 
packaging, food and drink), and Allied Lyons and Dalgety (food). Probably the largest and, 
in many ways, the most symbolic disinvestment was the sale in 1994  of most of Unilever's 
40% stake in the United Africa Company in Nigeria. 
 
In contrast, despite the concerted attempts by SSA governments and the Department of 
Trade and Industry to attract new British investment, only nine UK based companies  
(Bulmer, CDC, De La Rue, Glaxo, Guinness, Land Rover (British Aerospace) Lonrho, 
Paccar, Tollgate) invested in 18 new manufacturing investments in anglophone SSA between 
1989 and 1994. Only three of these companies (Bulmer, Paccar and Tollgate) did not already 
have existing manufacturing equity involvements in SSA.  The country breakdown of these 
new enterprises was as follows: Kenya, Zimbabwe (four each), Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania 
(two each), and Ghana, Nigeria, Swaziland and Zambia (one each).  Food and drink and 
textiles and clothing each accounted for four of these new enterprises, wood and paper, metal 
goods, chemicals and rubber and printing and publishing two each, and electrical goods one.  
8 
As has been shown elsewhere, these investments were made principally on the basis of 
company judgements about a country's economic and political stability coupled with 
fundamental market and cost considerations.  
 
As in 1989, a  small group of 20 parent companies continued to account for nearly 70% of 
all manufacturing equity involvements in anglophone SSA in 1994.9 The share of the two 
giants, Lonrho and Unilever increased slightly from 20.3% in 1989 to 22.4% in 1994 
(although both of them disposed of some equity involvements during this period). As 
predicted in 1989, smaller, less involved British companies have been more inclined to 
disinvest. Whereas UK parent companies with one equity stake accounted for 11.2% of all 
involvements in 1989, their share had fallen to 7.8% in 1994. 
 
Table 3 shows the distribution of equity involvements by industrial sector in 1989 and 1994. 
While significant disinvestment took place across all sectors, the incidence of withdrawal 
was greatest in the intermediate and capital goods sector. By 1994, less than 30% of all 
manufacturing enterprises (56 in total) were engaged in the manufacture of metal goods and 
transport equipment and mechanical engineering. Disinvestment has therefore reinforced the 
already dominant pattern of UK equity involvements in the production of relatively low 
value added wage goods (most notably beer and spirits, cigarettes, soap and detergents, basic 
foodstuffs, plastic and rubber goods, textiles and clothing), bulky intermediate goods (such 
as cement), and a very limited range of metal and electrical goods. Most of these activities 
use relatively simple and increasingly out-dated technologies. With many parent companies 
continuing to run down their manufacturing investments in SSA, this has adversely affected 
the already limited process of technology transfer.  
 
Disinvestment has not resulted in any major change in the overall pattern of equity 
involvement among UK parent companies in manufacturing enterprises in the survey 
countries. Parent companies were majority shareholders in 66.6% and 69.7% of 
manufacturing enterprises in 1989 and 1994 respectively. Equity participation was increased 
in just 12 enterprises and reduced in another 16 enterprises.    
 
Expatriate, predominantly 'home country' managers and technicians were employed by UK 
parent companies in their subsidiaries and associates in SSA mainly because of the 
unavailability of local personnel with the requisite skills and experience to fill key 
management and technical positions and not, as is often suggested, in order to establish 
direct control over subsidiary operations. The number and incidence of expatriate personnel 
is a key indicator therefore of the development of national technological and management 
capabilities. Limited evidence from the questionnaire surveys suggests that reliance on 
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expatriates actually increased between 1989 and 1993. This may be due to a number of 
factors including the need for more intensive management in rapidly deteriorating business 
environments coupled with the continued shortage of local managers with the requisite skills 
which, in some countries, has been exacerbated by  international migration. 
 
 
V.  DISINVESTMENT AND ADJUSTMENT 
 
The report of the 1989 survey identified unacceptably low levels of profitability over long 
periods of time due mainly to shortages of foreign exchange as being the principal reason for 
disinvestment by UK companies from SSA during the 1980s.  "The really critical issue has 
been the chronic and persistent shortage of foreign exchange in SSA during the 1980s which 
has meant that, because subsidiaries have been unable to remit most of their profits (or have 
been subject to long delays), the effective rates of return in sterling terms to parent 
companies have been considerably less than the often quite respectable local currency rates 
of return" [Bennell, 1990:166]. Foreign exchange availability continued to be a key factor 
fuelling the much higher rate of disinvestment during 1989-1994.  
 
Data could not be obtained on the (in-country) rates of return on capital employed in 
manufacturing enterprises from which UK companies had disinvested.10 However, these 
data are available for 72 enterprises where UK parent companies had active equity 
involvements in mid 1994. Overall rates of return on capital employed were higher among 
this group of enterprises than they were among the mainly different group surveyed in 1989. 
In particular, 54.4% had rates of return of 20% and higher compared with only 30.0% among 
the 1989 group.11 
 
The CSO Overseas Transactions and Assets data also indicate that the overall rate of return 
on UK manufacturing investments in Africa as a whole was slightly higher during 1988-
1992 than the pre-adjustment period 1980-1987 (20.4% and 17.4% respectively). With the 
exception of electrical goods and "other manufacture" (which includes textiles and cement 
and bricks), rates of return on UK investments in Africa increased in all manufacturing sub-
sectors in the period 1988-1992. However, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the level of these sectoral rates of return and the incidence of disinvestment by 
sector . 
Country level data are limited but what are available suggest that the largest increases in 
manufacturing (in-country) rates of return were in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia, countries that 
according to the IBRD's Adjustment in Africa Report had small improvements or 
deterioration in macroeconomic policies (see Table 4). In contrast, in two out of the three 
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countries categorised by this Report as having made large improvements in macroeconomic 
policies and for which data are available, rates of return on UK manufacturing investments 
fell appreciably (Nigeria) or remained largely unchanged (Zimbabwe) between the pre-
adjustment and adjustment time periods. 
 
Decomposing each rate of return estimate into its two constituent parts (ie. net earnings and 
capital employed) is also illuminating. It can be observed in Table 4 that the average annual 
net earnings from UK manufacturing investments fell substantially between 1980-87 and 
1989-92 in Nigeria and Tanzania which had large improvements in macroeconomic policies, 
but increased appreciably in the three countries that either had small improvements or 
deterioration in their adjustment regimes. In the case of Kenya and Zambia, however, higher 
net earnings were offset by significant declines in the book value of UK manufacturing net 
assets of 44.2% and 34.1% respectively which, to a large extent, were  due to currency 
devaluations.  
 
According to the CSO data, rates of returns (based on net earnings) for UK manufacturing 
investments in Africa compared quite favourably with other regions of the world throughout 
the 1980s and early 1990s12 (see Table 5). A common observation made by senior managers 
of UK parent companies is that, given the considerable risks involved in investing in Africa 
coupled with often high overhead costs, rates of return have to be higher than elsewhere if 
their companies are to continue to operate in difficult business environments.  
 
Without knowing what rates of return were among disinvesting companies, it is impossible 
to say to what extent profitability per se  has been the key factor responsible for 
disinvestment in Africa. While the CSO survey data indicate that aggregate profitability of 
manufacturing investments for the continent as a whole was relatively high in the mid-late 
1980s, it may well be that for significant numbers of individual manufacturing enterprises, 
profitability reached unacceptably low levels.  
 
While it is clear that factors other than short-term profitability have influenced investment 
levels (in particular, investor perceptions of the credibility of economic reforms over the 
long run), the translation of subsidiary profits into sterling remittances for parent companies 
and their shareholders in the UK remains the fundamental issue for all foreign investors. The 
value of sterling remittances is determined by two factors-the percentage of profits that are 
actually remitted and the rate of exchange at which this transaction is undertaken. 
Surprisingly, CSO data indicate that the share of net earnings from UK manufacturing 
investments in Africa remitted each year to the UK was higher than the global average 
between 1985 and 1990 (34.3% compared with 26.6%). Why then has the rate of profit 
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remittance been such a critical concern for UK investors in Africa? The most plausible 
explanation is that while UK companies have been keen to reinvest very sizeable proportions 
of their profits in North America, Europe and Asia, investment opportunities in 
manufacturing have generally been very limited in Africa and thus, given the option, most 
parent companies would like to remit the bulk of subsidiary profits from the region.  
 
By making foreign exchange more available, adjustment should enable foreign investors to 
remit higher proportions of their locally generated profits than hitherto. However, Table 6 
shows that, with the exception of Zimbabwe, the share of profits remitted to the UK actually 
fell or stagnated in adjusting countries. This would suggest that either that liberalisation of 
foreign exchange markets has not in fact enabled UK subsidiaries to gain greater access to 
foreign exchange or that those companies that are deciding to stay are voluntarily deciding to 
re-invest a greater share of their profits.  Whatever the reason, the fact remains that, with at 
best only one-third of profits being remitted in most survey countries, sterling rates of return 
(net of local taxes) for manufacturing investments were typically well  under 10% (see 
below). 
 
The other determinant of the sterling value of profit remittances from investment overseas is 
the prevailing rate of exchange. There were major currency devaluations in virtually all 
anglophone SSA countries during the period 1989-1994, most of which were part and parcel 
of adjustment programmes. While devaluation gives the manufacturing sector increased 
protection from competitive imports, it increases the cost of imported raw materials which 
many industries remain heavily reliant upon. Just what impact changes in the costs of now 
more available imported inputs have on profits will depend on the extent to which they can 
be passed on in higher prices coupled with changes in the overall level of demand and 
possible productivity improvements resulting from higher rates of capacity utilisation. But 
the most serious immediate impact on foreign investors of any large devaluation is that it 
reduces the sterling value of profit remittances by the same percentage amount. With 
continuous devaluations, this problem is further compounded the longer the delays that are 
encountered in remitting profits. 
 
Although information on subsidiary profits was not requested as part of the parent company 
questionnaire, data were collected on the percentage change in the nominal value of 
production expressed in local currency units for each equity involvement. When deflated by 
the percentage devaluation of each national currency against sterling during the same period, 
this yields the percentage change in  nominal production expressed in pounds sterling. In 
total, production data were obtained for 61 wholly and partially British owned 
manufacturing subsidiaries in anglophone SSA countries. It can be observed in Table 7 that 
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for nearly 55% of these subsidiaries, the sterling value of production declined between 1989 
and 1993. For 26 subsidiaries (42.6% of the total), this decline was more than 25% of the 
1989 sterling value of production.   
 
Among the 25 manufacturing enterprises for whom employment data are available in both 
1989 and 1994, 12 (44.0%) reported declines in the number of employees, and another four 
no change. By sub-sector, metal goods, textiles, cement and publishing had overall increases 
in employment while electrical goods, food and drink and chemicals and rubber had overall 
falls. Employment increased in Nigeria and Zimbabwe by 13-14% but fell in Kenya by 
11.3%. Although these data are limited, they provide further evidence of contracting activity 
among a sizeable proportion of UK subsidiary and associate companies in SSA during 
adjustment. 
    
From unpublished CSO survey data, it is possible to ascertain the overall impact of 
adjustment on the sterling profitability of UK manufacturing investments in five individual 
survey countries as well as in Africa as a whole. Comparing the pre-adjustment period 1980-
87 with 1988-92, the largest percentage increases in the value of sterling profits remitted to 
the UK were recorded in the two countries (Kenya and Malawi) categorised by the 
Adjustment in Africa Report as having made only small improvements in macroeconomic 
policies. Sterling profits plummeted in Nigeria and Zambia. They recorded a healthy 
increase in Zimbabwe but adjustment did not effectively start until 1991. 
 
Higher sterling profits were achieved in Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe despite very 
sizeable devaluations, no significant increases in (low) rates of profit remittance, and actual 
falls in the sterling value of production for at least one half of all UK subsidiaries.  However, 
as was discussed earlier, these negative factors were counteracted in some countries by 
generally higher rates of return (in local currency units) which, in turn, could only have been 
achieved by companies increasing their margins (ie. or the rate of profit on turnover). This 
could have been part of a deliberate strategy by some UK subsidiaries to maximise short run 
profits immediately prior to widely anticipated  increases in import competition in the later 
stages of adjustment.   
 
Although absolute sterling profits increased in some countries during adjustment, the overall 
impact on sterling rates of return was minimal. It can be observed in Table 6 that these rates 
of return ranged from 3.5-6.4% in all five countries for which data are available. The overall 
rate for Africa was just 6.0%. Thus, although there was some improvement in sterling rates 
of return for some countries, adjustment has not yet resulted in sufficiently large increases 
that would make manufacturing investments in SSA attractive in  global  terms.    
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Generally speaking, senior mangers of UK companies tend to be highly critical of 
adjustment in SSA. Common complaints are that adjustment programmes are too simplistic 
and "naive", fail to take into account local conditions, and have been too rapidly 
implemented in many countries. There is widespread concern that the short term costs of 
adjustment on manufacturing in Africa are so great, that there may be "nothing left" in the 
medium to long term. Reactions of this kind are consistent with the companies concerned 
having been highly protected and finding it difficult to survive after trade liberalisation. 
Clearly,  therefore, where foreign owned enterprises are irredeemably inefficient, 
disinvestment is likely to be beneficial. 
 
Quite apart from concerns about profitability, the decision to disinvest by a number of 
important British companies in the manufacturing sector in SSA has been primarily 
motivated by an overriding strategic objective to "concentrate on core activities" in their 
principal markets worldwide. They have therefore sold their manufacturing interests that lie 
outside of these core activities, not only in Africa but elsewhere in the world. For a company 
like Unilever that has invested in a wide range of manufacturing activities during the last 40-
50 years (in particular in Nigeria), this "refocusing" of global activities clearly has major 
implications for their future involvement in Africa.13 
 
More generally, the acute and persistent difficulties that confronted UK parent companies 
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s in managing their manufacturing subsidiaries in 
SSA prompted many of them to sell what were usually very minor parts of their global 
operations.  In Nigeria, for example, one manager wrote, "We divested earlier this year 
(1994). I am afraid the economic, political and social background made the running of the 
subsidiary business untenable". Similarly, the 1992 Annual Report of Low and Bonar plc 
states "The sale of remaining African businesses marked the end of an era going back almost 
seventy years. The business climate there has been exceedingly difficult for some time and 
with the opportunity of remitting dividends proving difficult, a sale was in the best interests 
of our shareholders" [Low and Bonar, 1992:8]. It is because UK managers have grown so 
weary of dealing with all the problems of manufacturing in Africa that probably explains 
why disinvestment has been so pervasive and why it is difficult therefore to discern any 
distinct patterns of disinvestment with respect to sector, profitability and rates of return. 
 
Finally, most UK parent companies are not prepared to disinvest unless there is a willing 
buyer who is prepared to pay a realistic price for their equity stake. Where therefore a 
country has a relatively well developed indigenous industrial class (as is the case in 
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Zimbabwe, Kenya and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria) then one would expect, ceteris paribus, 
relatively higher levels of disinvestment. 
 
Disinvesting companies were often reluctant to divulge information about the new owners of 
their erstwhile subsidiary and associate companies. Finding out to whom equity stakes have 
been sold will require therefore more detailed research. But on the basis of the information 
obtained so far, the following ownership patterns seem to be emerging: (i) Perhaps not 
surprisingly, very few companies were bought by other transnational corporations, either 
from the UK or other major industrial countries; (ii) The relatively well developed, albeit 
white, business class in Zimbabwe has been very willing to acquire the manufacturing 
interests of disinvesting British companies, often in the form of management buy-outs. There 
is also some evidence of growing South African involvement; (iii) In Kenya, local Asian 
industrialists have been the main group of buyers; and (iv) In Nigeria, disinvesting 
companies were particularly reluctant to divulge the identity of the new owners. This was 
probably because a sizeable proportion of purchases were made off-shore by Nigerians, quite 
possibly using  the proceeds of illegal transactions. 
 
 
VI.  DISINVESTMENT AND DEINDUSTRIALISATION 
 
It is difficult (although not impossible) to reconcile the widespread withdrawal of UK 
manufacturing companies from SSA between 1989 and 1994 with the optimistic assessment 
presented in the IBRD's Adjustment in Africa Report of the impact of adjustment policies on 
manufacturing enterprise coupled with its strong refutation of persistent criticisms that 
adjustment is resulting in the rapid deindustrialisation of Africa. It is important to note, 
however, that the statistics used in this Report to show that "industry is expanding" (in 
particular, in the countries with the largest improvements in macroeconomic policies) do not 
go beyond 1991. All the evidence (albeit fragmentary) for the period 1992-94 indicates that 
the value of manufacturing production in almost all survey countries fell substantially. In 
particular, in some countries (such as Ghana), it was not until the early 1990s that trade 
liberalisation measures really started "to bite" [See Lall et al, 1993]. 
 
In Zimbabwe, manufacturing industry contracted by 40% in 1992 and another 16.8% during 
the first eight months of 1993. While the effects of a serious drought were partially 
responsible for these falls in production, the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industry clearly 
identified very high interest rates, shortage of money supplies and increased foreign 
competition as the major causes. Writing in September 1993, the President of the CZI stated 
that "What we have in Zimbabwe is a road to economic ruin and deindustrialisation" [CZI, 
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1993:21]. In Zambia, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry reported that 17% of its 
members were forced to close during 1993 and predicted that this figure would rise to 25% 
in 1994. Local markets were flooded by cheap imports from Zimbabwe and South Africa and 
production costs remained high boosted by large increases in electricity tariffs and wages. 
[See DTI, 1994]. In Nigeria, the manufacturing sector was reported to be on "the verge of 
collapse" in mid 1993 [Thompson, 1992:35].  
 
Whether or not the acute problems faced by manufacturing sectors in anglophone SSA 
during 1991-1994 are, to use the anodyne terminology of the Adjustment in Africa Report, 
just part of "a difficult transition phase" [op cit:149] or the manifestations of a far more 
serious process of deindustrialisation cannot yet be satisfactorily answered. However, it is 
clear that economic conditions during the greater part of the period 1991-1994 did 
deteriorate in most of these countries. For UK parent companies this was undoubtedly the 
major factor that for many of them tipped the balance in favour of disinvestment. 
 
Disinvestment per se need not be harmful for the industrial prospects of SSA countries. 
Dependency theorists will no doubt welcome the curtailment of what they see as the 
exploitation of small, poor economies by an important segment of international capital. 
Clearly, a key question is what will happen to  previously British owned manufacturing 
enterprises? What will happen to wage levels and employment? Will their new owners 
maintain current industrial capacity or asset strip? How efficiently (and ethically)14 will 
they be managed? What links, if any, will be established with the old parent company or 
other foreign companies that will ensure access to new technologies, management and 
technical skills, and overseas markets? "Externalised" forms of involvement by TNCs such 
as these are increasingly common in developing countries. They generally entail 
considerably less risk and are potentially lucrative with assured payments in foreign 
exchange for services rendered. [See UNCTC, 1989 and UNCTAD, 1994].  
 
The experience of Japan and the NICs highlights the importance of being able to learn from 
foreigners, especially during the early stages of an industrialisation process. The precise 
modalities of this learning process have varied considerably from one country to another. 
Some countries like Singapore have relied mainly on direct foreign investment while others 
(most notably South Korea) have used more arms length technical agreements with 
technology suppliers and overseas training institutions. Although there are some exceptions, 
foreign investment in Africa has not resulted in the same kind of dynamic learning process 
as in other countries. It is clearly important to understand the reasons for this. It is 
conceivable that disinvestment could mark the start of new relationships between parent 
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companies and their erstwhile subsidiary and associate companies in SSA that  result in more 
positive learning outcomes. 
 
 
VII.  FUTURE PROSPECTS:THE DE-INDUSTRIAL DECADE FOR AFRICA?  
 
Two principal conclusions emerge from this research. First, there has been widespread 
disinvestment by UK parent companies with manufacturing equity involvements in 
anglophone SSA between 1989 and 1994. Thus, the really key issue for those concerned to 
promote FDI is as  much how to keep what foreign investment remains as it is to attract new 
inflows. As was noted in the 1989 survey, "most industrial FDI in SSA will depend on the 
response of existing tncs to growth in local markets for their products. For nearly all the 
survey countries, their overall economic growth will continue to be based on heavily on 
agricultural and mineral exports, the longer-term prospects for which remain poor" [op 
cit:172]. Nothing has changed in the interim to alter this assessment. 
 
Asked about their future intentions, most UK company questionnaire respondents indicated 
that they expect to maintain and, where real opportunities arise, increase their  
manufacturing activities in SSA.15  But, as Table 8 shows, the overall level of concern about 
foreign exchange issues (in particular, overall forex availability, dividend remittance, and 
exchange rate stability) among company respondents increased quite significantly between 
the 1989 and 1994 surveys.16 Unless, therefore, persistent and deep-seated foreign exchange 
problems can be satisfactorily resolved then the prospects for significant increases in 
manufacturing  FDI even among existing investors remain bleak. This highlights yet again 
the key importance of economic and political "fundamentals" in determining the overall 
level of FDI to any particular country. As one company respondent succinctly put it, "The 
issues which cause us to make investments are mostly economic rather than government 
regulations/policies.. We do not see any economic/market justification for making any 
further external investment". More generally, as long as UK and other investors remain 
uncertain about the attitudes of SSA governments towards FDI, then there is little likelihood 
of any major changes in investor behaviour. In particular, privatisation remains stalled in 
many SSA countries precisely because of political sensitivities concerning the selling off of 
state assets to foreigners or white and Asian nationals. This sends clear signals that 
underlying anti-FDI attitudes that prevailed in the pre-adjustment era have not really 
changed. 
 
There is a core group of UK companies mostly with multi-country interests in SSA who will 
continue to take a long term view and, in the words of  a senior UK manager, "hang on in the 
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hope that things will get better". But other companies will continue to leave. Just when they 
actually disinvest will depend to a large extent on the availability of suitable buyers. Looking 
at current trends, there may be no more than 30-40 UK companies with equity involvements 
in manufacturing enterprises  by the end of the Second Industrial Decade in Africa.17 
 
With so much disinvestment having taken place and with more in prospect, it is perhaps not 
surprising that SSA governments are finding it so difficult to privatise state-owned 
manufacturing enterprises many of which are little more than 'white elephants'. Certainly the 
expectation has been that major transnational corporations will purchase these enterprises 
but this seems increasingly unlikely.18 
 
It is not possible to determine at this stage whether corporate disinvestment is directly linked 
to a process of adjustment-induced de-industrialisation in Africa. What is clear however is 
that UK corporate disengagement is the result of stalled industrialisation in the continent. 
Sterling rates of return on UK manufacturing investments are simply too low for most 
companies and the business environment so difficult that disinvestment has been the 
inevitable consequence.  In assessing the costs and benefits for African countries of this 
process of disinvestment, much will depend on the managerial and technical skills and future 
intentions of the new owners of erstwhile British companies. Without large scale and 
sustained technical and managerial assistance from foreign companies, there is a real danger 
that indigenous technological capacities particularly in more complex product sectors will 
continue to remain seriously deficient. 
 
The second main conclusion of this research is that adjustment in anglophone SSA countries, 
while not the direct cause of disinvestment, has for most British manufacturing companies 
exacerbated already very difficult business conditions. The impact of massive devaluations 
on the sterling values of production and profits for parent companies and their shareholders 
has been particularly serious. While the debate continues about the costs and benefits of 
adjustment for industrial development in Africa, adjustment has undermined the resolve of a 
very sizeable proportion of UK companies to continue to operate in SSA. Generally 
speaking, given that "Africa did not recover after 1985" [Mosley and Weeks, 1993:1589], it 
is not surprising that by the early 1990s so many UK companies decided to sell up. The 
proponents of adjustment may argue that this is part of an unavoidable process of 
"rationalization" of inefficient manufacturing sectors. But, for those concerned about the 
long term industrial development of African countries, adjustment has often been introduced 
too quickly and provided too few  incentives for potentially viable manufacturing enterprises 
to modernise and become competitive. 
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NOTES 
 
1. According to Mosley and Weeks, adjustment programmes were in  place in Kenya, 
Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zambia before 1985 and introduced during 1985-87 in 
Gambia, Tanzania, and Uganda. However, Zimbabwe did not embark on  full fledged 
adjustment until late 1990.  [See Mosley and Weeks, 1993]. 
 
2. Just what these data are is not stated but presumably they are drawn from the IMF. 
 
3. British FDI in South Africa and Namibia have not been included in this study. Cameroon, 
although partly English speaking, is mainly Francophone in character, as are the island states 
of Seychelles and Mauritius. Ethiopia and Sudan were also excluded. 
 
4. Precise country level data on the composition of FDI by country are not available. These 
estimates were obtained from various sources including [Widstrand 1975], [Cable and 
Persuad 1987], [Clarke 1980], [Stoneman 1979], and [Bennell 1984]. 
 
5. Enterprises covered by the surveys include all manufacturing listed in sections 2-4 of the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Tea factories were excluded.  
 
6. Definitions of subsidiaries and associate companies vary. However, for the purposes of 
this research, a subsidiary is defined as having more than 50% equity involvement by the UK 
parent company and an associate has less than 50%. 
 
7. Companies that completed the survey questionnaires in 1989 and 1994 comprised fairly 
representative samples (in terms of size and sector) of both UK parent companies and SSA  
enterprises from their respective populations. 
 
8. This highlights the importance of distinguishing clearly between FDI from internally 
generated profits and new injections of externally funded FDI. The standard sources of FDI 
statistics, the IMF and OECD, do not make this distinction. 
 
9. These companies are as follows: Allied Lyons, BAT, Blue Circle, BOC, Cadbury 
Schweppes, CarnaudMetalBox, Coates, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, 
GEC, Grand Metropolitan, Guinness, Longman, Lonrho, Paterson Zochonis, Reckitt and 
Colman, Sara Lee Corporation, Smithkline Beecham, Tate & Lyle, T & N, and Unilever.  
 
10. Virtually all disinvesting companies stated that there was little or not point in them 
participating in the survey.  
 
11. However, among the 14 enterprises (wholly or partially owned by six UK parent 
companies) where data are available for both survey years, 6 (42.9%) had lower RORs in 
1994,  5 (35.7%) had RORs that were in the same ROR range, and only 3 (21.4%) had RORs 
that were in higher ROR ranges. 
 
12. For all UK overseas investments, the ROR in SSA was 30.3% in 1990. This was higher 
than any other region in the world: 28.1%  Asia, 6.2% North America, 10.1% Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and 11.2% Europe. 
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13. With the departure of Tiny Rowland in October 1994, Lonrho may well sell a 
considerable proportion of its manufacturing subsidiary and associate companies in Africa in 
order to concentrate on its "central businesses" of mining, agriculture, and general trading. 
 
14. A senior manager of a major UK multinational that had disinvested from Nigeria stated 
that "Asian businessmen are prepared to do things that we as a major multinational cannot 
do". Similar statements were commonly expressed by UK managers, suggesting that 
disinvestment could result in a decline in business ethics that could adversely affect attempts 
to improve democracy and establish 'good government'. 
 
15. Among the 14 parent companies who provided information, nine gave strong positive 
indications that they plan to maintain and, when appropriate, increase their activities in SSA 
(in the form of increased investment and/or shareholding). Only three stated that they had no 
specific plans. One respondent indicated that they would sell two of their investments if 
suitable buyers become available. However, it is important to make a clear distinction 
between the reinvestment of internally generated profits and new injections of investment 
funding from overseas sources. It is likely that most investment will be of the former type. 
 
16. Respondents were asked the following question: What (four) actions by host countries 
would most encourage your company to increase its level of investment in these (SSA) 
subsidiaries/associates? In 1989, 39.5% of all responses concerned foreign exchange issues 
compared with 56.0% in 1989. 
 
17. In addition, quasi-public organisations such as the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation and the International Finance Corporation which are politically mandated to 
continue to invest in manufacturing activities in Africa will become increasingly important. 
 
18. Unless parastatal enterprises are strongly export-oriented, the risk of sizeable 
devaluations is likely to be a major deterrent for potential buyers especially if substantial 
new investment is required in order to restore/achieve acceptable levels of efficiency and 
output.  In addition, the prospect of major import liberalisation programmes constitutes a 
major threat. 
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Table 1:  Average annual net investment by British companies in anglophone SSA by 
country and macroeconomic performance, 1980-1987 and 1988-1992 (£.million). 
 
 
 
 
  
Manufacturing 
 
 
All 
Country 1980-87 1988-92 +/- 1980-87 1988-92 +/- 
 
Large improvements 
Gambia 0.0 0.0  -0.3 -1.0 - 
Ghana -0.5 0.8 + 3.6 30.6 + 
Nigeria 11.1 16.4 + 18.0 85.5 + 
Tanzania 1.1 1.0 - 2.6 1.0 - 
Overall 12.7 18.2  23.9 107.5 + 
 
Small improvements 
 
  
Kenya 8.5 13.8 + 18.8 30.2 + 
Malawi 1.9 3.8 + 7.9 6.8 - 
Uganda 0.2 -  -0.6 1.2 + 
Overall 10.4 17.6  26.1 38.2 + 
 
Deterioration 
 
  
Sierra Leone 0.8 0.1 - 0.5 3.0 - 
Zambia 6.5 13.0 + 17.6 19.6 + 
Overall 7.3 13.0  18.1 22.6 + 
 
Others 
 
    
Botswana 0.2 -0.2 - -0.1 2.8 + 
Swaziland - -  3.0 1.0 - 
Overall - -  2.9 3.8 + 
 
 
Source:  CSO, Overseas Transactions, MA4 Business Monitor 
 
Notes:  Zimbabwe has been excluded from the large improvement group because the adjustment 
programme did not effectively begin until mid 1991. 
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Table 2:  Parent companies and equity involvements by country and macroeconomic 
performance category, 1989 and 1994. 
 
 
 UK Parent Companies 
 
Equity Involvements 
 
Country 1989 1994 %  1989 1994 %  
 
Large improvements 
 
   
Gambia 1 0 -100.0 1 0 -100.0 
Ghana 10 7 -30.0 15 13 -13.3 
Nigeria 47 33 -29.8 71 49 -31.0 
Tanzania 6 3 -50.0 6 3 -50.0 
Zimbabwe 58 43 -25.9 95 66 -29.0 
Sub-total 75 55 -26.7 188 131 -30.3 
 
Small improvements 
 
   
Kenya 43 28 -34.9 60 36 -40.0 
Malawi 13 9 -30.8 19 14 -26.3 
Uganda 8 5 -37.5 9 5 -44.4 
Sub-total 45 33 -26.7 88 55 -37.5 
 
Deterioration 
 
   
Sierra Leone 2 2 0.0 3 3 0.0 
Zambia 20 16 -20.0 34 23 -32.3 
Sub-total 21 17 -23.5 37 26 -29.7 
 
Others 
 
      
Botswana 7 6 -14.3 7 7 0.0 
Lesotho 2 1 -50.0 2 1 -50.0 
Liberia 2 2 0.0 2 2 0.0 
Swaziland 7 6 -14.3 12 11 -8.3 
Sub-total 14 12 -14.3 23 21 -8.7 
 
Africa 
 
 
90 
 
65 
 
-27.8 
 
336 
 
233 
 
-30.6 
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Table 3:  UK equity involvements by manufacturing sector, 1989 and 1994. 
 
 Number involvements 
 
Percentage breakdown 
 
Sector 1989 1994 %  1989 1994 Difference 
 
Food, drink 
 
71 
 
55 
 
-22.5 
 
21.1 
 
23.6 
 
2.5 
Textiles, clothing 25 -16.0 8.9 8.9 10.7 1.8 
Wood, paper 14 6 -57.1 4.2 2.6 -1.6 
Chemicals, rubber 95 65 -46.1 28.3 27.9 -0.4 
Cement, bricks 17 13 -23.5 5.1 5.6 0.5 
Metal goods 38 27 -40.7 11.6 11.3 -0.3 
Mech. engineering 16 11 -31.3 4.8 4.7 -0.1 
Electrical goods 23 8 -65.2 6.8 3.4 -3.4 
Transport 
equipment 
14 7 -50.0 4.2 3.0 -1.2 
Printing 6 3 -50.0 1.8 1.3 -0.5 
Publishing 12 13 8.3 3.6 5.6 2.0 
Totals 336 233 -30.7 100.0 100.0 0.0 
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Table 4:  Net earnings, value of assets and in-country rates of return for British 
manufacturing subsidiaries and associate companies in Africa, 1980-87 and 1988-92 
 
 
 Net earnings (£m) 
 
 
Book value net 
assets (£m) 
 
Rate of return 
 
Country 1980-87 1988-92 %  1987 1992 1980-87 1988-92 
 
Large improvement 
 
    
Nigeria 28.6 21.8 -23.8 103 89 27.8 24.5
Tanzania 0.6 0.2 -66.7 8 2 7.5 10.0
Zimbabwe 29.5 32.0 8.5 141 159 20.9 20.1
Sub-total1 29.2 22.0 -24.7 111 91 26.5 25.3
 
Small improvement 
 
    
Kenya 11.6 18.8 62.0 156 87 7.4 21.6
Malawi 1.9 5.2 173.7 24 30 7.9 17.3
Sub-total 13.5 24.0 77.8 180 117 7.5 20.5
 
Deterioration 
 
    
Zambia 10.0 13.0 30.0 44 29 22.7 44.8
Africa 117.0 132.6 13.3 669 649 17.5 20.4
 
Notes:  1  Zimbabwe excluded for reason given in Table 2 
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Table 5:  Net earnings as a percentage of book values of UK overseas manufacturing 
investments by region, 1978-91 
 
 
Year Europe North 
America 
Other 
developed 
Africa Asia Latin 
America 
Overall 
1978 9.0 9.3 12.6 11.9 12.2 11.4 9.5
1981 5.4 12.8 17.6 11.0 15.3 22.9 12.7
1984 9.0 7.9 11.0 12.0 22.2 - 10.1
1987 15.0 15.9 15.5 17.9 18.3 31.9 16.3
1991 12.6 12.9 11.1 23.1 35.9 14.8 14.2
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Table 6:  Rates of profit remittance, average annual profits remitted and sterling rates of 
return for UK manufacturing investments in SSA, 1980-87 and 1988-92 
 
 
 % profits remitted  
 
Ave annual profits remitted 
 
UK rate of return
 
Country 1980-87 1988-92 Difference 1980-87 1988-92 %  1980-87 1988-92
 
Large improvements 
 
     
Nigeria 29.9 20.8 -9.1 10.6 4.4 -140.9 10.3 4.9
Zimbabw
e 
23.5 31.9 8.4 6.4 10.1 57.8 4.5 6.3
 
Small improvements 
 
     
Kenya 38.0 29.8 -8.2 4.4 5.6 27.2 2.8 6.4
Malawi 30.8 32.8 2.0 0.6 1.5 150.0 2.5 5.0
 
Deterioration 
 
     
Zambia 22.4 7.7 -14.7 2.2 1.0 -120.0 5.0 3.4
Africa 
 
33.1 29.9 -3.2 37.0 39.2 -5.9 5.5 6.0
 
Notes:  Profits are post-tax 
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Table 7:  Change in nominal value (pounds sterling) of production among British 
manufacturing subsidiaries in anglophone SSA, 1989 and 1993 (1989 = 100). 
 
 
 Decrease 
 
Increase 
 
Country < 50 51-75 76-99 100-125 126-150 150 > N
 
Large improvements 
 
    
Ghana 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 33.3 33.3 3 
Nigeria 15.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 15.0 20 
Tanzania 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 
Zimbabwe 25.0 33.3 8.3 16.7 0.0 16.7 12 
Sub-total 19.4 16.7 8.3 13.9 19.4 22.2 36 
 
Small improvements 
 
    
Malawi 50.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 16.7 16.7 6 
Kenya 11.1 22.2 11.1 22.2 11.1 22.2 9 
Uganda 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 
Sub-total 25.0 18.8 12.5 12.5 12.5 18.8 16 
 
Deterioration 
 
    
Sierra 
Leone 
0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 
Zambia 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3 
Sub-total 75.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4 
 
Others 
 
       
Lesotho 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 1 
Swaziland 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4 
Sub-total 0.0 40.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 61 
Overall 23.0 19.6 11.5 13.1 14.7 18.0 100 
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Table 8:  Factors most likely to encourage investment - 1989 and 1994 survey responses 
(percentages) 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
FOREX 
avail. 
FOREX 
remitt-
ance 
 
FOREX 
stability
Econ. 
growth/
stability
 
Politica
l 
stability
Less 
corrup-
tion 
 
Skill 
avail. 
 
 
Others 
 
1989 
 
 
16.3 
 
20.9 
 
 2.3 
 
23.3 
 
 9.3 
 
7.0 
 
0.0 
 
20.9 
1994 
 
26.0 18.0 12.0 12.0 10.0 2.0 4.7 15.3 
 
 
 
 
